Index: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
===================================================================
--- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	(revision 267125)
+++ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	(working copy)
@@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ OpenSSL project.
 We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
 or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
 
+Major support:
+
+	Qualys		http://www.qualys.com/
+
 Very significant support:
 
-	OpenGear: www.opengear.com
+	OpenGear:	http://www.opengear.com/
 
 Significant support:
 
-	PSW Group: www.psw.net
+	PSW Group:	http://www.psw.net/
+	Acano Ltd.	http://acano.com/
 
 Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
 we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.
Index: CHANGES
===================================================================
--- CHANGES	(revision 267125)
+++ CHANGES	(working copy)
@@ -2,6 +2,50 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+     SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+     in a DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-0221)
+     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+     code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+     Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+     are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+     [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+     compilation flags.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
 
   *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
Index: FREEBSD-upgrade
===================================================================
--- FREEBSD-upgrade	(revision 267125)
+++ FREEBSD-upgrade	(working copy)
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrim
 # Xlist
 setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
 setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1g
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1g
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.1h
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_1h
 
 ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
 
Index: Makefile
===================================================================
--- Makefile	(revision 267125)
+++ Makefile	(working copy)
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1g
+VERSION=1.0.1h
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
Index: NEWS
===================================================================
--- NEWS	(revision 267125)
+++ NEWS	(working copy)
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
 
       o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
Index: README
===================================================================
--- README	(revision 267125)
+++ README	(working copy)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
Index: apps/enc.c
===================================================================
--- apps/enc.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/enc.c	(working copy)
@@ -331,6 +331,12 @@ bad:
         setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
+	if (cipher && EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "AEAD ciphers not supported by the enc utility\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
+
 	if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s is an unsupported message digest type\n",md);
Index: apps/ocsp.c
===================================================================
--- apps/ocsp.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/ocsp.c	(working copy)
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ENGINE *e = NULL;
 	char **args;
 	char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
+	char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
 	char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
 	char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
 	char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
@@ -204,6 +205,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 		else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url"))
 			{
+			if (thost)
+				OPENSSL_free(thost);
+			if (tport)
+				OPENSSL_free(tport);
+			if (tpath)
+				OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 			if (args[1])
 				{
 				args++;
@@ -212,6 +219,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 					BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
 					badarg = 1;
 					}
+				thost = host;
+				tport = port;
+				tpath = path;
 				}
 			else badarg = 1;
 			}
@@ -920,12 +930,12 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
 	sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
 
-	if (use_ssl != -1)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(host);
-		OPENSSL_free(port);
-		OPENSSL_free(path);
-		}
+	if (thost)
+		OPENSSL_free(thost);
+	if (tport)
+		OPENSSL_free(tport);
+	if (tpath)
+		OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 }
Index: apps/req.c
===================================================================
--- apps/req.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/req.c	(working copy)
@@ -1489,7 +1489,13 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n,nid, chtype,
 				(unsigned char *) buf, -1,-1,mval)) goto err;
 	ret=1;
@@ -1548,7 +1554,12 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
 
 	if(!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype,
 					(unsigned char *)buf, -1)) {
Index: apps/s_cb.c
===================================================================
--- apps/s_cb.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/s_cb.c	(working copy)
@@ -747,6 +747,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_serv
 		break;
 #endif
 
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
+		extname = "TLS padding";
+		break;
+
 		default:
 		extname = "unknown";
 		break;
Index: apps/s_socket.c
===================================================================
--- apps/s_socket.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/s_socket.c	(working copy)
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char
 		{
 		i=0;
 		i=setsockopt(s,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
-		if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
+		if (i < 0) { closesocket(s); perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
 		}
 #endif
 
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ redoit:
 		if ((*host=(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name)+1)) == NULL)
 			{
 			perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		BUF_strlcpy(*host,h1->h_name,strlen(h1->h_name)+1);
@@ -458,11 +459,13 @@ redoit:
 		if (h2 == NULL)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname failure\n");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		}
Index: apps/smime.c
===================================================================
--- apps/smime.c	(revision 267125)
+++ apps/smime.c	(working copy)
@@ -541,8 +541,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		{
 		if (!cipher)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2			
-			cipher = EVP_rc2_40_cbc();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES			
+			cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 			goto end;
Index: crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c	(working copy)
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE *
  * certain software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
  */
 
-static unsigned long global_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
 
 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
 {
Index: crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c	(working copy)
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long
 	bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
 	socklen_t sockopt_len = 0;
 	struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
-	struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
+	struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL;
 
 	data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *)b->ptr;
 
@@ -1388,6 +1388,11 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long
 		/* Add new key */
 		sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t);
 		authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
+		if (authkey == NULL)
+			{
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+			}
 		memset(authkey, 0x00, sockopt_len);
 		authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1;
 #ifndef __FreeBSD__
@@ -1399,6 +1404,8 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long
 		memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t));
 
 		ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey, sockopt_len);
+		OPENSSL_free(authkey);
+		authkey = NULL;
 		if (ret < 0) break;
 
 		/* Reset active key */
Index: crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/bn/bn_mont.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/bn/bn_mont.c	(working copy)
@@ -478,32 +478,38 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
 					const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
 
 	CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
-	if (!*pmont)
+	ret = *pmont;
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+	 * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+	 * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+	 * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+	 * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+	 * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */
+	ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+	if (!ret)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
 		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+		}
 
-		if (!*pmont)
-			{
-			ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-			if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
-				BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
-			else
-				*pmont = ret;
-			}
+	/* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
+	if (*pmont)
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		ret = *pmont;
 		}
-	
-	ret = *pmont;
-	
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
 	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		
+		*pmont = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
 	return ret;
 	}
Index: crypto/cms/cms_env.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/cms/cms_env.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/cms/cms_env.c	(working copy)
@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_Con
 	if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
 		{
 		ktri->version = 2;
+		if (env->version < 2)
+			env->version = 2;
 		type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
 		}
 	else
Index: crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/cms/cms_sd.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/cms/cms_sd.c	(working copy)
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd)
 			if (sd->version < 3)
 				sd->version = 3;
 			}
-		else
-			sd->version = 1;
+		else if (si->version < 1)
+			si->version = 1;
 		}
 
 	if (sd->version < 1)
Index: crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/cms/cms_smime.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/cms/cms_smime.c	(working copy)
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
-	int debug = 0;
+	int debug = 0, ri_match = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
 	if (ris)
 		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
@@ -620,6 +620,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
 		if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
 				continue;
+		ri_match = 1;
 		/* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo
 		 * otherwise try them all.
 		 */
@@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
 			}
 		}
 	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
-	if (!cert && !debug)
+	if (ri_match && !cert && !debug)
 		{
 		ERR_clear_error();
 		return 1;
Index: crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/dso/dso_dlfcn.c	(working copy)
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int dlfcn_pathbyaddr(void *addr,char *path,
 		return len;
 		}
 
-	ERR_add_error_data(4, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror());
+	ERR_add_error_data(2, "dlfcn_pathbyaddr(): ", dlerror());
 #endif
 	return -1;
 	}
Index: crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c	(working copy)
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ static int eckey_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *
 		EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
 		OPENSSL_free(ep);
 		ECerr(EC_F_ECKEY_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		return 0;
 	}
 	/* restore old encoding flags */
 	EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(ec_key, old_flags);
Index: crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c	(working copy)
@@ -1435,8 +1435,11 @@ int i2o_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out
 				*out, buf_len, NULL))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-		OPENSSL_free(*out);
-		*out = NULL;
+		if (new_buffer)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(*out);
+			*out = NULL;
+			}
 		return 0;
 		}
 	if (!new_buffer)
Index: crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h	(working copy)
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_P
 int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
 int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
 /* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */
 int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
 int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *);
Index: crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/evp/bio_b64.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/evp/bio_b64.c	(working copy)
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		else if (ctx->start)
 			{
 			q=p=(unsigned char *)ctx->tmp;
+			num = 0;
 			for (j=0; j<i; j++)
 				{
 				if (*(q++) != '\n') continue;
Index: crypto/evp/encode.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/evp/encode.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/evp/encode.c	(working copy)
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
 				v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n);
 				n=0;
 				if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; }
+				if (eof > v) { rv=-1; goto end; }
 				ret+=(v-eof);
 				}
 			else
Index: crypto/opensslv.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/opensslv.h	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/opensslv.h	(working copy)
@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000107fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000108fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1g-fips 7 Apr 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1h-fips 5 Jun 2014"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1g 7 Apr 2014"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
Index: crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c	(working copy)
@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_
 			nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
 		else
 #endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+		nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
 		nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
 		}
 	if (!nid_key)
 		nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
@@ -286,7 +290,11 @@ int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STAC
 		free_safes = 0;
 
 	if (nid_safe == 0)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+		nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
 		nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
 
 	if (nid_safe == -1)
 		p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
Index: crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c	(working copy)
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const ch
 			int len, r;
 			unsigned char *data;
 			len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
-			if(len > 0) {
+			if(len >= 0) {
 				r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
 				OPENSSL_free(data);
 				if (!r)
Index: crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c	(working copy)
@@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, B
 		{
 	case NID_pkcs7_signed:
 		data_body=PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
+		if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL)
+			{
+			PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		md_sk=p7->d.sign->md_algs;
 		break;
 	case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
@@ -928,6 +933,7 @@ int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_sign(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
 	if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx,abuf,alen) <= 0)
 		goto err;
 	OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+	abuf = NULL;
 	if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
 		goto err;
 	abuf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
Index: crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h	(working copy)
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ void ERR_load_PKCS7_strings(void);
 #define PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER			 121
 #define PKCS7_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE			 131
 #define PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER			 143
+#define PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE		 155
 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE			 132
 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR			 133
 #define PKCS7_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR			 134
Index: crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c	(working copy)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA PKCS7_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER),"error setting cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE)   ,"invalid mime type"},
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER),"invalid null pointer"},
+{ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_INVALID_SIGNED_DATA_TYPE),"invalid signed data type"},
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE),"mime no content type"},
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR)    ,"mime parse error"},
 {ERR_REASON(PKCS7_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR),"mime sig parse error"},
Index: crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c	(working copy)
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PA
 		if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 		}
-	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "0x14 (default)") <= 0)
+	else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
 		goto err;
 	BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
 
Index: crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c	(working copy)
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, const char
 		else a[i] = loc - b64table;
 		++i;
 		}
+	/* if nothing valid to process we have a zero length response */
+	if (i == 0)
+		return 0;
 	size = i;
 	i = size - 1;
 	j = size;
Index: crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c	(working copy)
@@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_IN
 	X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
 	OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
 	*imprint_len = 0;
+	*imprint = NULL;
 	return 0;
 	}
 
Index: crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c	(revision 267125)
+++ crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c	(working copy)
@@ -389,8 +389,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
 	/* Handle proxy certificates */
 	if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
 		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
-		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
-		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
+		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
+		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
 			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
 		}
 		if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
-	i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, 0);
+	i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
 	if (i_ext >= 0)
 		{
 		X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
Index: doc/apps/cms.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/cms.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/cms.pod	(working copy)
@@ -90,6 +90,11 @@ decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and pr
 encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail
 is written to the output file.
 
+=item B<-debug_decrypt>
+
+this option sets the B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> flag. This option should be used
+with caution: see the notes section below.
+
 =item B<-sign>
 
 sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is
@@ -446,32 +451,42 @@ Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operatio
 since the content is no longer part of the CMS structure the encoding
 remains DER.
 
+If the B<-decrypt> option is used without a recipient certificate then an
+attempt is made to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient
+in turn using the supplied private key. To thwart the MMA attack
+(Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are
+tried whether they succeed or not and if no recipients match the message
+is "decrypted" using a random key which will typically output garbage. 
+The B<-debug_decrypt> option can be used to disable the MMA attack protection
+and return an error if no recipient can be found: this option should be used
+with caution. For a fuller description see L<CMS_decrypt(3)|CMS_decrypt(3)>).
+
 =head1 EXIT CODES
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 the operation was completely successfully.
 
-=item 1 
+=item Z<>1
 
 an error occurred parsing the command options.
 
-=item 2
+=item Z<>2
 
 one of the input files could not be read.
 
-=item 3
+=item Z<>3
 
 an error occurred creating the CMS file or when reading the MIME
 message.
 
-=item 4
+=item Z<>4
 
 an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message.
 
-=item 5
+=item Z<>5
 
 the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
 the signers certificates.
Index: doc/apps/enc.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/enc.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/enc.pod	(working copy)
@@ -215,7 +215,11 @@ unsupported options (for example B<openssl enc -he
 list of ciphers, supported by your versesion of OpenSSL, including
 ones provided by configured engines.
 
+The B<enc> program does not support authenticated encryption modes
+like CCM and GCM. The utility does not store or retrieve the
+authentication tag.
 
+
  base64             Base 64
 
  bf-cbc             Blowfish in CBC mode
Index: doc/apps/s_server.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/s_server.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/s_server.pod	(working copy)
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
 [B<-no_ssl3>]
 [B<-no_tls1>]
 [B<-no_dhe>]
+[B<-no_ecdhe>]
 [B<-bugs>]
 [B<-hack>]
 [B<-www>]
@@ -131,6 +132,11 @@ a static set of parameters hard coded into the s_s
 if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively
 disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites.
 
+=item B<-no_ecdhe>
+
+if this option is set then no ECDH parameters will be loaded effectively
+disabling the ephemeral ECDH cipher suites.
+
 =item B<-no_tmp_rsa>
 
 certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option
Index: doc/apps/smime.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/smime.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/smime.pod	(working copy)
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used
 example B<-aes_128_cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for list of ciphers
 supported by your version of OpenSSL.
 
-If not specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
+If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
 
 =item B<-nointern>
 
@@ -308,28 +308,28 @@ remains DER.
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 the operation was completely successfully.
 
-=item 1 
+=item Z<>1
 
 an error occurred parsing the command options.
 
-=item 2
+=item Z<>2
 
 one of the input files could not be read.
 
-=item 3
+=item Z<>3
 
 an error occurred creating the PKCS#7 file or when reading the MIME
 message.
 
-=item 4
+=item Z<>4
 
 an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message.
 
-=item 5
+=item Z<>5
 
 the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out
 the signers certificates.
Index: doc/apps/verify.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/verify.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/verify.pod	(working copy)
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-untrusted file>]
 [B<-help>]
 [B<-issuer_checks>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
 [B<-verbose>]
 [B<->]
 [certificates]
@@ -80,6 +81,12 @@ rejected. The presence of rejection messages does
 anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
 rejections may take place.
 
+=item B<-attime timestamp>
+
+Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
+current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
+01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
+
 =item B<-policy arg>
 
 Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
@@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ an application specific error. Unused.
 
 =head1 BUGS
 
-Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still
+Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
 suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
 trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
 B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only
Index: doc/apps/version.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/version.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/version.pod	(working copy)
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ B<openssl version>
 [B<-o>]
 [B<-f>]
 [B<-p>]
+[B<-d>]
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ the date the current version of OpenSSL was built.
 
 option information: various options set when the library was built.
 
-=item B<-c>
+=item B<-f>
 
 compilation flags.
 
Index: doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod	(working copy)
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ Example:
  O=Organisation
  CN=Some Name
 
- 
+
 =head2 Certificate Policies.
 
 This is a I<raw> extension. All the fields of this extension can be set by
@@ -390,8 +390,8 @@ Examples:
  nameConstraints=permitted;email:.somedomain.com
 
  nameConstraints=excluded;email:.com
-issuingDistributionPoint = idp_section
 
+
 =head2 OCSP No Check
 
 The OCSP No Check extension is a string extension but its value is ignored.
Index: doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/CMS_decrypt.pod	(working copy)
@@ -27,8 +27,22 @@ function or errors about unknown algorithms will o
 
 Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
 needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
-structure. If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried.
+structure.
 
+If B<cert> is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
+is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
+PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
+not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
+the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
+to) ultimately return a padding error only. If CMS_decrypt() just returned an
+error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
+use this in a timing attack. If the special flag B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> is set
+then the above behaviour is modified and an error B<is> returned if no
+recipient encrypted key can be decrypted B<without> generating a random
+content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
+B<extreme caution> especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
+open to attack.
+
 It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
 example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
 in advance using the CMS utility functions such as CMS_set1_pkey(). In this
Index: doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod	(working copy)
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ None of the functions return a value.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>,
-L<CONF_modules_load_file(3), CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)|CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
Index: doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod	(working copy)
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ return value of the failing module (this will alwa
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>,
-L<CONF_free(3), CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3),err(3)>
+L<CONF_free(3)|CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
Index: doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod	(working copy)
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() r
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<CONF_load_modules_file(3)|CONF_load_modules_file(3)>,
-L<CONF_modules_free(3),CONF_modules_free(3)>
+L<CONF_modules_free(3)|CONF_modules_free(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
Index: doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod	(working copy)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ set first so the relevant field information can be
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>,
-L<OBJ_nid2obj(3),OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
+L<OBJ_nid2obj(3)|OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
Index: doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod	(working copy)
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index, X509_STORE_CTX_se
 
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx, void *arg);
 
- char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx);
+ void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *d, int idx);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
Index: doc/fingerprints.txt
===================================================================
--- doc/fingerprints.txt	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/fingerprints.txt	(working copy)
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ pub   2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13
       Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60  41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97
 uid                  Dr S N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
 
+pub   4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19
+      Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5  D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2
+uid                  Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@opensslfoundation.com>
+uid                  Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>
+uid                  Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+sub   4096R/8811F530 2005-03-19
+
 pub   1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24
       Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25  0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF
 uid                  Mark Cox <mjc@redhat.com>
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_COMP_add_compression_method.pod	(working copy)
@@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ SSL_COMP_add_compression_method() may return the f
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_session.pod	(working copy)
@@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ The following values are returned by all functions
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
  The operation failed. In case of the add operation, it was tried to add
  the same (identical) session twice. In case of the remove operation, the
  session was not found in the cache.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
  
  The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.pod	(working copy)
@@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The operation failed because B<CAfile> and B<CApath> are NULL or the
 processing at one of the locations specified failed. Check the error
 stack to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod	(working copy)
@@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ values:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
 the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
 to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod	(working copy)
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback
  void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
  void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
 
- void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
- void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod	(working copy)
@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot
 broken SSL implementations.  This option has no effect for connections
 using other ciphers.
 
+=item SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
+
+Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between
+256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some
+implementations.
+
 =item SSL_OP_ALL
 
 All of the above bug workarounds.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod	(working copy)
@@ -64,13 +64,13 @@ return the following values:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The length B<sid_ctx_len> of the session id context B<sid_ctx> exceeded
 the maximum allowed length of B<SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH>. The error
 is logged to the error stack.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version.pod	(working copy)
@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ and SSL_set_ssl_method():
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The new choice failed, check the error stack to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint.pod	(working copy)
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ data to B<psk> and return the length of the random
 connection will fail with decryption_error before it will be finished
 completely.
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 PSK identity was not found. An "unknown_psk_identity" alert message
 will be sent and the connection setup fails.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod	(working copy)
@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 established.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_clear.pod	(working copy)
@@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The SSL_clear() operation could not be performed. Check the error stack to
 find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The SSL_clear() operation was successful.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod	(working copy)
@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 established.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod	(working copy)
@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
 established.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod	(working copy)
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ SSL_get_peer_cert_chain - get the X509 certificate
 
  #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 
- STACKOF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACKOF(X509) certificates
+SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() returns a pointer to STACK_OF(X509) certificates
 forming the certificate chain of the peer. If called on the client side,
 the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server
 side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is
 The peer certificate chain is not necessarily available after reusing
 a session, in which case a NULL pointer is returned.
 
-The reference count of the STACKOF(X509) object is not incremented.
+The reference count of the STACK_OF(X509) object is not incremented.
 If the corresponding session is freed, the pointer must not be used
 any longer.
 
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
 No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established
 or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused.
 
-=item Pointer to a STACKOF(X509)
+=item Pointer to a STACK_OF(X509)
 
 The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_read.pod	(working copy)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
 The read operation was successful; the return value is the number of
 bytes actually read from the TLS/SSL connection.
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The read operation was not successful. The reason may either be a clean
 shutdown due to a "close notify" alert sent by the peer (in which case
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_session_reused.pod	(working copy)
@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 A new session was negotiated.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 A session was reused.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_set_fd.pod	(working copy)
@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_set_session.pod	(working copy)
@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The operation failed; check the error stack to find out the reason.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The operation succeeded.
 
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod	(working copy)
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
 if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
 The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
 erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
 
-=item 1
+=item Z<>1
 
 The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
 and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
Index: doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod
===================================================================
--- doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod	(revision 267125)
+++ doc/ssl/SSL_write.pod	(working copy)
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ The following return values can occur:
 The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of
 bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection.
 
-=item 0
+=item Z<>0
 
 The write operation was not successful. Probably the underlying connection
 was closed. Call SSL_get_error() with the return value B<ret> to find out,
Index: engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c
===================================================================
--- engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c	(revision 267125)
+++ engines/ccgost/gost_ameth.c	(working copy)
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int pkey_ctrl_gost(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
 		case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
 			if (arg1 == 0)
 				{
-				X509_ALGOR *alg;
+				X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
 				ASN1_STRING * params = encode_gost_algor_params(pkey);
 				if (!params) 
 					{
Index: ssl/Makefile
===================================================================
--- ssl/Makefile	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/Makefile	(working copy)
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES=
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
Index: ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/d1_both.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/d1_both.c	(working copy)
@@ -627,8 +627,17 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
 		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
 		}
 	else
+		{
 		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+			{
+			item = NULL;
+			frag = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
 
+
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
 	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
 	 */
@@ -674,8 +683,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if (item == NULL)
 			{
+			i = -1;
 			goto err;
-			i = -1;
 			}
 
 		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
@@ -784,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
 	int i,al;
 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
 
+	redo:
 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
 		{
@@ -842,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
 					s->msg_callback_arg);
 			
 			s->init_num = 0;
-			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
-				max, ok);
+			goto redo;
 			}
 		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
 			{
Index: ssl/d1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/d1_lib.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/d1_lib.c	(working copy)
@@ -176,9 +176,12 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
 
 	while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
 		{
-		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-		OPENSSL_free(frag);
+		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+			}
+		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
 		pitem_free(item);
 		}
 	}
Index: ssl/d1_pkt.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/d1_pkt.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/d1_pkt.c	(working copy)
@@ -239,14 +239,6 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue,
 	}
 #endif
 
-	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
-	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
-		pitem_free(item);
-		return(0);
-		}
-
 	s->packet = NULL;
 	s->packet_length = 0;
 	memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
@@ -259,7 +251,16 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue,
 		pitem_free(item);
 		return(0);
 		}
-	
+
+	/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
+	if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+		pitem_free(item);
+		return(0);
+		}
+
 	return(1);
 	}
 
Index: ssl/d1_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/d1_srvr.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/d1_srvr.c	(working copy)
@@ -1356,6 +1356,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			    (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
 			    encodedlen);
 			OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+			encodedPoint = NULL;
 			p += encodedlen;
 			}
 #endif
Index: ssl/heartbeat_test.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/heartbeat_test.c	(revision 0)
+++ ssl/heartbeat_test.c	(working copy)
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/* test/heartbeat_test.c */
+/*
+ * Unit test for TLS heartbeats.
+ *
+ * Acts as a regression test against the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160).
+ *
+ * Author:  Mike Bland (mbland@acm.org, http://mike-bland.com/)
+ * Date:    2014-04-12
+ * License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC By 4.0)
+ *          http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US
+ *
+ * OUTPUT
+ * ------
+ * The program returns zero on success. It will print a message with a count
+ * of the number of failed tests and return nonzero if any tests fail.
+ *
+ * It will print the contents of the request and response buffers for each
+ * failing test. In a "fixed" version, all the tests should pass and there
+ * should be no output.
+ *
+ * In a "bleeding" version, you'll see:
+ *
+ *   test_dtls1_heartbleed failed:
+ *     expected payload len: 0
+ *     received: 1024
+ *   sent 26 characters
+ *     "HEARTBLEED                "
+ *   received 1024 characters
+ *     "HEARTBLEED                \xde\xad\xbe\xef..."
+ *   ** test_dtls1_heartbleed failed **
+ *
+ * The contents of the returned buffer in the failing test will depend on the
+ * contents of memory on your machine.
+ *
+ * MORE INFORMATION
+ * ----------------
+ * http://mike-bland.com/2014/04/12/heartbleed.html
+ * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html
+ */
+
+#include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h"
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+
+/* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */
+#define MIN_PADDING_SIZE	16
+
+/* Maximum number of payload characters to print as test output */
+#define MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS	1024
+
+typedef struct heartbeat_test_fixture
+	{
+	SSL_CTX *ctx;
+	SSL *s;
+	const char* test_case_name;
+	int (*process_heartbeat)(SSL* s);
+	unsigned char* payload;
+	int sent_payload_len;
+	int expected_return_value;
+	int return_payload_offset;
+	int expected_payload_len;
+	const char* expected_return_payload;
+	} HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char* const test_case_name,
+	const SSL_METHOD* meth)
+	{
+	HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
+	int setup_ok = 1;
+	memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture));
+	fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;
+
+	fixture.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
+	if (!fixture.ctx)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL_CTX for test: %s\n",
+			test_case_name);
+		setup_ok = 0;
+		goto fail;
+		}
+
+	fixture.s = SSL_new(fixture.ctx);
+	if (!fixture.s)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL for test: %s\n", test_case_name);
+		setup_ok = 0;
+		goto fail;
+		}
+
+	if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(fixture.s, 1))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set up wbio buffer for test: %s\n",
+			test_case_name);
+		setup_ok = 0;
+		goto fail;
+		}
+
+	if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(fixture.s))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to setup buffers for test: %s\n",
+			test_case_name);
+		setup_ok = 0;
+		goto fail;
+		}
+
+	/* Clear the memory for the return buffer, since this isn't automatically
+	 * zeroed in opt mode and will cause spurious test failures that will change
+	 * with each execution.
+	 */
+	memset(fixture.s->s3->wbuf.buf, 0, fixture.s->s3->wbuf.len);
+
+	fail:
+	if (!setup_ok)
+		{
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+		}
+	return fixture;
+	}
+
+static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_dtls(const char* const test_case_name)
+	{
+	HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name,
+		DTLSv1_server_method());
+	fixture.process_heartbeat = dtls1_process_heartbeat;
+
+	/* As per dtls1_get_record(), skipping the following from the beginning of
+	 * the returned heartbeat message:
+	 * type-1 byte; version-2 bytes; sequence number-8 bytes; length-2 bytes
+	 *
+	 * And then skipping the 1-byte type encoded by process_heartbeat for
+	 * a total of 14 bytes, at which point we can grab the length and the
+	 * payload we seek.
+	 */
+	fixture.return_payload_offset = 14;
+	return fixture;
+	}
+
+/* Needed by ssl3_write_bytes() */
+static int dummy_handshake(SSL* s)
+	{
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_tls(const char* const test_case_name)
+	{
+	HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name,
+		TLSv1_server_method());
+	fixture.process_heartbeat = tls1_process_heartbeat;
+	fixture.s->handshake_func = dummy_handshake;
+
+	/* As per do_ssl3_write(), skipping the following from the beginning of
+	 * the returned heartbeat message:
+	 * type-1 byte; version-2 bytes; length-2 bytes
+	 *
+	 * And then skipping the 1-byte type encoded by process_heartbeat for
+	 * a total of 6 bytes, at which point we can grab the length and the payload
+	 * we seek.
+	 */
+	fixture.return_payload_offset = 6;
+	return fixture;
+	}
+
+static void tear_down(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+	{
+	ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+	SSL_free(fixture.s);
+	SSL_CTX_free(fixture.ctx);
+	}
+
+static void print_payload(const char* const prefix,
+		const unsigned char *payload, const int n)
+	{
+	const int end = n < MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS ? n
+	    : MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	printf("%s %d character%s", prefix, n, n == 1 ? "" : "s");
+	if (end != n) printf(" (first %d shown)", end);
+	printf("\n  \"");
+
+	for (; i != end; ++i)
+		{
+		const unsigned char c = payload[i];
+		if (isprint(c)) fputc(c, stdout);
+		else printf("\\x%02x", c);
+		}
+	printf("\"\n");
+	}
+
+static int execute_heartbeat(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
+	{
+	int result = 0;
+	SSL* s = fixture.s;
+	unsigned char *payload = fixture.payload;
+	unsigned char sent_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 1];
+	int return_value;
+	unsigned const char *p;
+	int actual_payload_len;
+
+	s->s3->rrec.data = payload;
+	s->s3->rrec.length = strlen((const char*)payload);
+	*payload++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+	s2n(fixture.sent_payload_len, payload);
+
+	/* Make a local copy of the request, since it gets overwritten at some
+	 * point */
+	memcpy((char *)sent_buf, (const char*)payload, sizeof(sent_buf));
+
+	return_value = fixture.process_heartbeat(s);
+
+	if (return_value != fixture.expected_return_value)
+		{
+		printf("%s failed: expected return value %d, received %d\n",
+					 fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_value,
+					 return_value);
+		result = 1;
+		}
+
+	/* If there is any byte alignment, it will be stored in wbuf.offset. */
+	p = &(s->s3->wbuf.buf[
+			fixture.return_payload_offset + s->s3->wbuf.offset]);
+	actual_payload_len = 0;
+	n2s(p, actual_payload_len);
+
+	if (actual_payload_len != fixture.expected_payload_len)
+		{
+		printf("%s failed:\n  expected payload len: %d\n  received: %d\n",
+					 fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_payload_len,
+					 actual_payload_len);
+		print_payload("sent", sent_buf, strlen((const char*)sent_buf));
+		print_payload("received", p, actual_payload_len);
+		result = 1;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		char* actual_payload = BUF_strndup((const char*)p, actual_payload_len);
+		if (strcmp(actual_payload, fixture.expected_return_payload) != 0)
+			{
+			printf("%s failed:\n  expected payload: \"%s\"\n  received: \"%s\"\n",
+						 fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_payload,
+						 actual_payload);
+			result = 1;
+			}
+		OPENSSL_free(actual_payload);
+		}
+
+	if (result != 0)
+		{
+		printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", fixture.test_case_name);
+		}
+	return result;
+	}
+
+static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[])
+	{
+	/* Omit three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+	return strlen((const char*)&payload_buf[3]) - MIN_PADDING_SIZE;
+	}
+
+#define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\
+	HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up_##type(__func__);\
+	int result = 0
+
+#define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\
+	if (execute_heartbeat(fixture) != 0) result = 1;\
+	tear_down(fixture);\
+	return result
+
+static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[] = "   Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding"
+		"                ";
+	const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload()
+	{
+	int payload_buf_len;
+
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a NUL
+	 * at the end */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MIN_PADDING_SIZE];
+	memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+	payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+	payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[] = "   HEARTBLEED                ";
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+	/* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length +
+	 * minimum padding */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3];
+	memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+	payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
+	/* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte in excess of maximum allowed
+	 * heartbeat message length */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 2];
+	memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+	payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_tls1_not_bleeding()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[] = "   Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding"
+					"                ";
+	const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_tls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload()
+	{
+	int payload_buf_len;
+
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a NUL
+	 * at the end */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MIN_PADDING_SIZE];
+	memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+	payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+	payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_tls1_heartbleed()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls);
+	/* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[] = "   HEARTBLEED                ";
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+static int test_tls1_heartbleed_empty_payload()
+	{
+	SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(tls);
+	/* Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length +
+	 * minimum padding */
+	unsigned char payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3];
+	memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
+	payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';
+
+	fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
+	fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
+	fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
+	fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
+	fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
+	EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
+	}
+
+#undef EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST
+#undef SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+	{
+	int num_failed;
+
+	SSL_library_init();
+	SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+	num_failed = test_dtls1_not_bleeding() +
+	    test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() +
+	    test_dtls1_heartbleed() +
+	    test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() +
+	    /* The following test causes an assertion failure at
+	     * ssl/d1_pkt.c:dtls1_write_bytes() in versions prior to 1.0.1g: */
+	    (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000107fL ?
+	     test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length() : 0) +
+	    test_tls1_not_bleeding() +
+	    test_tls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload() +
+	    test_tls1_heartbleed() +
+	    test_tls1_heartbleed_empty_payload() +
+	    0;
+
+	ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+	if (num_failed != 0)
+		{
+		printf("%d test%s failed\n", num_failed, num_failed != 1 ? "s" : "");
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS*/
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+	{
+		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+	}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */

Property changes on: ssl/heartbeat_test.c
___________________________________________________________________
Added: svn:mime-type
## -0,0 +1 ##
+text/plain
\ No newline at end of property
Added: svn:keywords
## -0,0 +1 ##
+FreeBSD=%H
\ No newline at end of property
Added: svn:eol-style
## -0,0 +1 ##
+native
\ No newline at end of property
Index: ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/s3_clnt.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/s3_clnt.c	(working copy)
@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
 
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 	    s->hit=1;
 	    }
 	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
@@ -2510,6 +2512,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
 			int field_size = 0;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			/* Did we send out the client's
 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
Index: ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/s3_pkt.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/s3_pkt.c	(working copy)
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #define USE_SOCKETS
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
@@ -580,10 +581,11 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 	{
 	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
-	unsigned int tot,n,nw;
-	int i;
+	unsigned int n,nw;
+	int i,tot;
 
 	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+	OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
 	tot=s->s3->wnum;
 	s->s3->wnum=0;
 
@@ -598,6 +600,22 @@ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void
 			}
 		}
 
+	/* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write 
+	 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete 
+	 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding 
+	 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
+	 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
+	 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
+	 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
+	 * will notice
+	 */
+	if (len < tot)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+
+
 	n=(len-tot);
 	for (;;)
 		{
@@ -641,9 +659,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const u
 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 
- 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
-		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
-			return -1;
 
 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
@@ -659,6 +674,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const u
 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 		}
 
+ 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
+		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+			return -1;
+
 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1055,7 +1074,7 @@ start:
 				{
 				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
 				rr->off=0;
-				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
 					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
 				}
 			}
@@ -1297,6 +1316,15 @@ start:
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 
+		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
 		rr->length=0;
 
 		if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -1431,7 +1459,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
 
 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
 		{
-		if (s->session == NULL) 
+		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
 			{
 			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
Index: ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/s3_srvr.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/s3_srvr.c	(working copy)
@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #else
 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+					{
+					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+					}
 				else
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #endif
@@ -2097,6 +2102,11 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
 		s->init_num=n+4;
 		s->init_off=0;
 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
 
 		/* do the header */
@@ -2813,6 +2823,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
 			size_t outlen=32, inlen;
 			unsigned long alg_a;
+			int Ttag, Tclass;
+			long Tlen;
 
 			/* Get our certificate private key*/
 			alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
@@ -2834,26 +2846,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 					ERR_clear_error();
 				}
 			/* Decrypt session key */
-			if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 
+			if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || 
+				Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
+			 	Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) 
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				goto gerr;
 				}
-			if (p[1] == 0x81)
-				{
-				start = p+3;
-				inlen = p[2];
-				}
-			else if (p[1] < 0x80)
-				{
-				start = p+2;
-				inlen = p[1];
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-				goto gerr;
-				}
+			start = p;
+			inlen = Tlen;
 			if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 
 
 				{
Index: ssl/ssl.h
===================================================================
--- ssl/ssl.h	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/ssl.h	(working copy)
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */
 #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT			0x00000004L
 #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG		0x00000008L
-#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x00000010L
+#define SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING				0x00000010L
 #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER		0x00000020L
 #define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG			0x00000040L
 #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG			0x00000080L
@@ -562,6 +562,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 
 /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */
 #define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING			0x0
+/* Refers to ancient SSLREF and SSLv2, retained for compatibility */
+#define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG		0x0
 
 /* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
  * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.  Usually (depending on the application protocol)
Index: ssl/ssl3.h
===================================================================
--- ssl/ssl3.h	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/ssl3.h	(working copy)
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
  
 /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
Index: ssl/ssl_asn1.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/ssl_asn1.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/ssl_asn1.c	(working copy)
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, cons
 		if (os.length != 3)
 			{
 			c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+			c.line=__LINE__;
 			goto err;
 			}
 		id=0x02000000L|
@@ -420,6 +421,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, cons
 		if (os.length != 2)
 			{
 			c.error=SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH;
+			c.line=__LINE__;
 			goto err;
 			}
 		id=0x03000000L|
@@ -429,6 +431,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, cons
 	else
 		{
 		c.error=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION;
+		c.line=__LINE__;
 		goto err;
 		}
 	
@@ -521,6 +524,7 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, cons
 	    if (os.length > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
 		{
 		c.error=SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH;
+		c.line=__LINE__;
 		goto err;
 		}
 	    else
Index: ssl/ssl_err.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/ssl_err.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/ssl_err.c	(working copy)
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME),"tlsv1 unrecognized name"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION),"tlsv1 unsupported extension"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER),"tls client cert req with anon cipher"},
-{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbearts"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT),"peer does not accept heartbeats"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING) ,"heartbeat request already pending"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL),"tls illegal exporter label"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST),"tls invalid ecpointformat list"},
Index: ssl/ssl_lib.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/ssl_lib.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/ssl_lib.c	(working copy)
@@ -1349,6 +1349,10 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *bu
 
 	p=buf;
 	sk=s->session->ciphers;
+
+	if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
 	for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
 		{
 		int n;
Index: ssl/t1_enc.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/t1_enc.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/t1_enc.c	(working copy)
@@ -1048,14 +1048,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send
 	if (!stream_mac)
 		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("sec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
 printf("seq=");
 {int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("buf=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
 printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",rec->data[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
 	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
@@ -1185,7 +1181,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned c
 	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
 		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
 
-	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+	rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
 		      val, vallen,
 		      NULL, 0,
 		      NULL, 0,
Index: ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- ssl/t1_lib.c	(revision 267125)
+++ ssl/t1_lib.c	(working copy)
@@ -617,6 +617,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
 	/* Add Heartbeat extension */
+	if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+		return NULL;
 	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
 	s2n(1,ret);
 	/* Set mode:
@@ -661,8 +663,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
                 ret += el;
                 }
 #endif
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
 	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
 	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
 	 *
@@ -669,28 +669,29 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
 	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
 	 */
-	{
-	int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-	/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
-	 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
-	 * not. */
-	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
-		hlen -= 5;
-	if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
 		{
-		hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
-		if (hlen >= 4)
-			hlen -= 4;
-		else
-			hlen = 0;
+		int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+		/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
+		 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
+		 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
+		 */
+		if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+			hlen -= 5;
+		if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+			{
+			hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+			if (hlen >= 4)
+				hlen -= 4;
+			else
+				hlen = 0;
 
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
-		s2n(hlen, ret);
-		memset(ret, 0, hlen);
-		ret += hlen;
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+			s2n(hlen, ret);
+			memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+			ret += hlen;
+			}
 		}
-	}
-#endif
 
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
@@ -845,6 +846,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
 	/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
 	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
 		{
+		if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+			return NULL;
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
 		s2n(1,ret);
 		/* Set mode: