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# Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX support for FreeBSD

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
# Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX

- Extension to x86
- Introduced in SkyLake
  - kvm-sgx, qemu-sgx
- Allows creation of “Enclaves”

# Enclave

- Isolated compartments
- Enclave memory encrypted
- Enclaves are part of applications
  - But even less privileged
- No system calls allowed
- No direct calls between enclave and non-enclave memory
- No kernel enclaves, only userspace
- Statically linked, self-contained
  - `-nostdlib -nostdinc -nodefaultlibs -nostartfiles`

# Traditional UNIX & Enclaves



# Use cases


- When you want to securely compute data on remote machine
  - E.g. on more powerful machine
- When someone want to compute data on your machine
  - Remote guy does not trust me
- Pros:
  - Computation without data disclosure
  - Your provider does not see what you do

# Enclave Page Cache (EPC)

- Memory for enclaves (part of DRAM)
- Part of Processor Reserved Memory (RPM)
- Protected from DMA
- CPU provides 128 MB
  - 93.5mb on Lenovo X1 Carbon
  - 32mb on QEMU

# Enclave and EPC page types (3 of 5)

- PT\_SECS (SGX Enclave Control Structure)
  - One per enclave
  - VA, size
  - Inaccessible
- PT\_TCS (Thread Control Storage)
  - One per enclave thread
  - Entry point, SSA
  - Inaccessible
- PT\_REG (Regular data page)
  - SSA
  - STACK
  - DATA
  - CODE



# EPC Pages types (5 of 5)

- PT\_VA (Version array)
  - Used for eviction
  - 512 slots x 8 byte
- PT\_TRIM (Page is removed)

# Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX

- Kernel driver
  - `encls(opcode, ...)`
- Userspace SDK
  - `enclu(opcode, ...)`
  - Includes SGX service daemon (`aesm_service`)
  - Provides ABI: `ecall()`, `ocall()`
- No special compiler needed


# Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX userspace SDK

- A set of libraries
  - tlibc (openbsd)
  - tlibstdcxx -> tlibcxx (LLVM)
  - tlibthread
  - tseal
  - cpprt
  - sign\_tool
- ABI
  - sgx\_ecall(), sgx\_ocall()
- SGX Service daemon
  - aesmd\_service
- Sample Applications
- BSD licensed

# Intel<sup>®</sup> SGX kernel driver

- EPC pages management
- Character device
- MMAP
  - VM object constructor (sgx\_pg\_ctor)
  - VM object destructor (sgx\_pg\_dtor)
  - VM object fault handler (not in use)
- IOCTLs (not SGX standard)
  - IOCTL\_ENCLAVE\_CREATE
  - IOCTL\_ENCLAVE\_ADD\_PAGE
  - IOCTL\_ENCLAVE\_INIT
- ENCLS locking, #pg-s protection
- Linux compatibility layer

# vm\_object queue



# Enclave lifecycle

|           |         |  |
|-----------|---------|--|
| Kernel    | ECREATE | Adding SECS page                       |
|           | EADD    | Adding TCS, REG pages                  |
|           | EEXTEND | Measuring page                         |
|           | EPA     | Adding Version Array (VA) slot         |
|           | EINIT   | Finalize enclave creation              |
| Userspace | EENTER  | Go to entry point                      |
|           | EEXIT   | Return to main application             |
|           | ERESUME | Resume operation, e.g. after Interrupt |

# Operation flow 1: mmap

- `fd = open("/dev/sgx", ...);`
- `secs_ptr = mmap(NULL, fd, ... );`

Userspace

- `sgx_mmap_single():`  
Kernel driver creates VM object

Kernel

# Operation flow 2: enclave creation (SECS)

- struct sgx\_secs secs {  
    base = secs\_ptr;  
    size = 8192;  
    attributes = ...  
    ...}
- error = ioctl(fd,  
    ENCLAVE\_CREATE, &secs);

Userspace

- Copyin(secs)
- Validate SECS
- Lookup for VM object in process VM space
- Allocating struct enclave
- Enclave->object = object
- Get EPC from pool
- encls(EPA,...)
- vm\_page\_insert
- encls(ECREATE, .. )
- vm\_page\_insert

Kernel

# Operation flow 3: adding TCS page

- Struct `sgx_tcs` `tcs` {  
    `flags = ...`  
    `oentry = offset;`  
    `ossa = offset;`  
    `...`  
}
- Struct `add_page` {  
    `src_pge = &tcs;`  
    `secs = secs_ptr;`  
}
- `ioctl(fd, ADD_PAGE, &add_page);`

Userspace

- `Copyin(tcs)`
- `Validate TCS`
- `Lookup for enclave`
- `Get EPC page from pool`
- `encls(EADD, .. )`
- `encls(EEXTEND,..)`
- `encls(EPA,...)`
- `vm_insert(page, enclave->obj)`
- `vm_insert(vaslot, enclave->obj)`

Kernel

# Operation flow 4: adding REG pages

- `fd = open("enclave1.bin")`
- `ptr = mmap(NULL, fd, ...)`

- For each page:

```
struct sgx_addp {  
    src_pge = ptr[..];  
    secs = secs_ptr;  
}
```

```
ioctl(fd, ADD_PAGE, &addp);
```

- `munmap(fd)`

Userspace

- `copyin(secinfo)`
- Lookup for enclave
- Allocate EPC page
- `encls(EADD, .. )`
- `encls(EEXTEND,..)`
- `encls(EPA,...)`
- `vm_insert(epc_page, enclave->object)`

Kernel

# Operation flow 5: init enclave

```
• struct sgx_initp {  
    sigstruct = ...  
    einittoken = ...  
    addr = secs_ptr;  
}
```

```
ioctl(fd, EINIT, einitp);
```

Userspace

- Lookup for enclave
- copyin(sigstruct)
- copyin(einittoken)
- encls(EINIT, ...)

Kernel

# Operation flow 6: enter enclave

- `enclu(EENTER,.. )`
- `sgx_ecall()`
- `sgx_ocall()`

Userspace

# Operation flow 7: removing enclave

- `enclu(EEXIT, ...)`
- `munmap(secs_ptr, size);`

Userspace

- `pager_dtor()`:
  - 1) Enclave lookup
  - 2) for each page in object:
    - `vm_object_remove(page)`
    - `encls(EREMOVE,..)`
    - EPC returned to pool

Kernel

# Enclave and exceptions

- Exceptions generate AEX: Asynchronous Enclave Exit  
AEP pointer is called

```
enclu(EENTER, aep, ..)
```

```
void
```

```
aep() {
```

```
    ...exception handled here...
```

```
    enclu(ERESUME, ..)
```

```
}
```

# Attestation

- Don't know how exactly works
- Enclaves can prove to us that they are enclaves they claimed to be
- Each CPU has its own unique key as a root in key hierarchy, created on manufacture time
  - Enclave requests it using EGETKEY ?

# Review

- **D11113**
- [http://wiki.freebsd.org/Intel\\_SGX](http://wiki.freebsd.org/Intel_SGX)

Questions?